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Marriage: a meaningful relationship? 
 
For family lawyers with an interest in marriage, the latter decades of the 20
th
 Century 
were lean times. Marriage was a settled subject. From the 19
th
 Century Married 
Women’s Property Acts through to no-fault divorce and financial provision in the 
1970s and 80s, a century of legal reform had groomed a somewhat aged model and 
made it suitably modern for contemporary family law.
1
 Nagging doubts remained 
about declining social relevance, accompanied by growing interest in alternative 
relationships, but these were concerns which tended to divert our gaze away from 
marriage itself and towards the other, newer possibilities: cohabitation, civil union, 
Pacs,
2
 mother/child dyad,
3
 friendship.
4
 Marriage itself attracted relatively little 
attention. 
 
Then into that quiet and settled landscape, there blew “a perfect storm.”5 At the centre 
of the storm was same sex marriage but, caught up along with it, were calls and 
concerns from every perspective: conservative, liberal, religious, secular, feminist, 
functional, expressive.
6
 Far from being calm, settled and slightly overlooked, 
marriage has become fiercely contested and deeply controversial. Marriage is now at 
the centre of a struggle between conservatives and liberals, those who wish to 
preserve and those who wish to reform but, no matter the particular perspective or 
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purpose, the predominant message is clear: marriage matters and what is at stake is its 
value; its essence; its meaning.
7
  
 
What’s law got to do with it?  
So what is marriage; this concept so closely guarded by some and sought after by 
others? What does it mean? Not from a romantic, religious, personal or political 
perspective but from the perspective of family law.
8
 In recent commentary on 
marriage, the point is frequently made that, while marriage is a legal event, it “is not 
only a legal event”;9 while it is a legal contract, it is “not just a legal contract”.10 This 
acknowledgement of wider meaning, however, is often taken as a point of departure 
from which to explore these other meanings: the broader significance, the value of 
marriage beyond law. Relatively rarely
11
 does reflection turn inwards to scrutinize the 
“legal event”; the “legal contract”. Perhaps it is assumed that the legal essence of 
marriage is so well understood, and so firmly embedded in family law, that it requires 
no explanation.
12
 Value-laden marriage is a difficult institution for contemporary 
family law, with its preference for private ordering and its stance of apparent 
neutrality. Family lawyers may simply have lost the necessary language to discuss 
matters of meaning, in anything beyond the barest words of definition.
13
  
 
Difficult questions perhaps are best avoided. Certainly in Scotland, there is a long 
established pattern of lawyers and law reformers “avoiding the question” when it 
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comes to the meaning or essence of marriage. Rarely have we looked at marriage as a 
legal concept, as opposed to examining the mechanics of its constitution or the detail 
of its consequences. Looking back to 19
th
 Century treatises on the law of husband and 
wife
14
 or further back to the founding fathers of Scots law, the Institutional Writers,
15
 
the legal meaning of marriage was principled and clear. There was a coherent model, 
which made an explicit link between the discrete elements of the regulatory 
framework: the exchange of consent and the state of matrimony to which that consent 
gave access. Legal marriage required both elements, they were interdependent and 
each informed the other: 
The relation of husband and wife is constituted by marriage, which may be 
defined (if there is any need of defining it)
16
 a union for life, formed by 
consent, between male and female, for the purposes of living in family and 
rearing children.
17
 
While this legal model was both clear and coherent, it was increasingly out of date.  
 
Subsequent reform followed two separate paths: one focusing on the event, the 
wedding, and the other on the contract, what it means to be husband and wife and, 
throughout this process of reform, Scots law and lawyers have repeatedly avoided the 
question of what marriage means. From the late 19
th
 Century until the introduction of 
same sex marriage in 2014,
18
 there have been multiple commissions and committees 
tasked with formal review of legal marriage but each time, for various reasons, they 
have avoided the need, or missed the opportunity, to look at marriage as an integrated 
whole. Looking only at specific aspects of the law, they have tended to imply that 
there is something more to marriage but that “something more” happens not to be the 
topic of current review. Thus the essence of legal marriage remains elusive and it is 
always to be found elsewhere.  
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 P Fraser, Husband and Wife according to the Law of Scotland, 2
nd
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 Even then, there was a reluctance to define. 
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 Hume, Lectures on the Law of Scotland, 1786-1822, edited by GCH Paton, Edinburgh 1939-58, 19. 
18
 The Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977 was amended by the Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) 
Act 2014 to permit both same sex marriage and different sex marriage, with the first same sex 
marriages being solemnised just after midnight on 30 December 2014. 
When the Morison Committee reported on the Marriage Law of Scotland in 1937,
19
 
their remit was not to engage in substantial consideration of marriage but only to 
consider the rules relating to “the constitution of marriage”.20 For the Kilbrandon 
Committee in 1969,
21
 their focus was again on the solemnisation of marriage and not 
“the rights, obligations or relations which follow”.22 For both, “[t]he institution of 
marriage itself” 23 was placed beyond the scope of their review. While these 
Committees focused on weddings and marriage registration, the Scottish Law 
Commission concentrated on the consequences of marriage but they too, in similar 
fashion, recommended isolated reforms without reference to any unifying model.
24
  
 
The recent debate, which preceded the introduction of same sex marriage in 2014, 
provided a fresh opportunity to consider “the core” of marriage25 but once again Scots 
family law avoided engagement. Scrutiny of the Marriage and Civil Partnership 
(Scotland) Bill
26
 was conducted by the Scottish Parliament’s Equal Opportunities 
Committee, reflecting the fact that same sex marriage was really more about equality 
and human rights than about family law. In the report of the Committee, there was 
much discussion and argument over the personal, philosophical and religious 
meaning(s) of marriage but, notably absent from the conversations was the voice of 
family law. “[M]arriage is about love”27; “marriage is about commitment, children 
and complementarity”28 but there was no clarification of what marriage “is about” in 
law. When asked for guidance as to whether there was a definition of marriage, the 
Cabinet Secretary responded that “there is clearly a definition in law …”29 but failed 
to specify what that definition might be. 
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Family Law” (2006-07) 28 Cardozo Law Review 2133, 2152. 
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th
 Report, 2013 (Session 4), para 29: available at 
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 Individual reviews and reforms have focused on particular aspects of marriage law, no 
doubt for good reason but, nonetheless, the combined effect has been the gradual, and 
perhaps unconscious, uncoupling of previously integrated elements. A century after 
the Victorian reformers first began the process of modernisation, we now have a 
much clearer, more efficient and administratively more certain system for the 
regulation of weddings
30
 but we have little shared legal understanding of the “wedded 
state”31 and therein lurks the doubt as to what it is that defines legal marriage: where 
its fundamental meaning lies.  
 
What makes it marriage? 
The classic legal model of marriage depended on the symbiosis of two elements: 
matrimonial consent and the status of husband and wife. Marriage required both and 
each reflected and reinforced the other. The required consent was “matrimonial 
consent”, that is consent to be husband and wife, and what it meant to be husband and 
wife was clearly constructed by legally defined spousal obligations. The relationship 
of living together as husband and wife was premised on consent having been 
exchanged and it was that matrimonial consent which distinguished a couple living as 
husband and wife from a couple living together “in sin”, in concubinage or in some 
other form of relationship. The legal meaning of marriage subsisted in neither of these 
elements singly but rather was to be found in their reinforcing circularity: 
cohabitation as husband and wife is a manifestation by daily conduct of the 
parties having consented to contract that relation inter se. It is a holding forth 
to the world, by the manner of daily life, by the conduct and demeanour of the 
parties, that the man and woman who live together have agreed to take each 
other in marriage.
32
 
 
If we accept that the value of contemporary marriage is to a considerable extent 
“conferred upon it by those who enter it”,33 then the process of trying to define its 
value in legal terms may be regarded as of little import. Marriage is whatever each 
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 As set out in the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977. 
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 Hume, Lectures on the Law of Scotland, 1786-1822, edited by GCH Paton, Edinburgh 1939-58, at 
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 J Eekelaar, “Evaluating Legal Regulation of Family Behaviour” (2010) 1 International Journal of the 
Jurisprudence of Family Law 17, 27 
couple wants it to be. But is that what family law believes? As it has retreated from 
defining either matrimonial consent or the concept of living together as husband and 
wife, has the law created space for couples to inspire these concepts with their own 
meaning? Or does family law continue to build on the premise that marriage has some 
distinctive and objectively determined meaning? And if there is something distinctive 
about marriage where does that distinctiveness lie: in the wedding or in the wedded 
life?  
 
These are not idle musings on a purely academic question but they are matters of 
increasing urgency in a family law framework which has expanded beyond the law of 
husband and wife to incorporate the law of civil partners and of unmarried 
cohabitants. In the UK, civil partnership was introduced in 2004 as a political 
compromise for same sex couples,
34
 which “import[ed] almost the entire body of law 
relating to marriage into the new institution” but without using the word “marriage”.35 
When same sex marriage became legal,
36
 civil partnership was retained and so now 
there are two distinct institutions, each almost identical to the other, with the anomaly 
that marriage is open to both same sex and different sex couples, while civil 
partnership remains restricted to the former.
37
 In Scotland, there are also limited rights 
for unmarried cohabitants,
38
 who qualify to claim
39
 on the basis that they have lived 
together as if they were husband and wife.
40
  
 
Is it all about the wedding? 
                                                        
34
 Civil Partnership Act 2004. 
35
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36
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37
 Department for Culture, Media & Sport, Civil Partnership Review (England and Wales) – Report on 
Conclusions, 2014: accessible at 
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(2013) International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 143; F McCarthy, “Playing the percentages: 
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If we are looking for the essence of what makes marriage distinctive, might it lie in 
the wedding? While marriage rates have been steadily declining for many decades, 
those “couples who do wish to marry want their wedding to be a ‘full flourish’”.41 In 
popular culture, the wedding has become a highly personalised event, a celebration of 
the couple and imbued with the meaning of their own relationship, but what does it 
mean for family law?
42
  
 
Scots family law is unusual in that until very recently it did not require a wedding in 
order to create a marriage. For Canon law, the essence of marriage was consent, and 
focus on this consensual nature led Scots law to retain irregular marriage long after it 
was abolished in other jurisdictions. Historically, although the majority of marriages 
were regular, a substantial number were irregular in that they came into being without 
ceremony or other formality.
43
 While two forms of irregular marriage were abolished 
with effect from 1940,
44
 the third, marriage by cohabitation with habit and repute, 
continued until 2006.
45
 Framed as outdated, unruly and uncivilised,
46
 throughout a 
lengthy campaign for reform, the final abolition of irregular marriage in 2006 was 
both inevitable and apparently positive. Without doubt, the peculiar legal 
requirements of marriage by cohabitation with habit and repute had become unsuited 
to contemporary society.
47
 A different narrative, however, could have been 
constructed: one which highlighted the functional equivalence of couples who live in 
similarly committed lifestyles, regardless of public ceremony and which recognised 
the benefits of enabling the courts to treat as marriage “associations which have been 
marriages in all but name”.48  Set against what is known of contemporary social 
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 J Haskey in J Miles, P Mody and R Probert (eds), Marriage Rites and Rights, 2015, Hart Publishing, 
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attitudes,
49
 the view that “the rite of marriage has lost much of the social significance 
it once had”,50 not to mention the cost of weddings, the legal shift from the old 
“irregular” view of marriage, which was prepared to overlook the absence of a 
wedding, to the new, which regards the wedding as the essential signifier, becomes of 
less obvious merit. 
 
In other ways, weddings have also moved to the fore in Scots family law. Scotland 
has a long established reputation as a wedding destination. Unlike many European 
jurisdictions, it offers both civil and religious marriage and in contrast to England, 
where the regulation of marriage formation is beset by complexity and structural 
constraint,
51
 the Scottish system is simple and flexible. Most recently, choice has been 
further extended beyond religious or civil weddings through the authorisation of 
celebrants of non-religious “belief organisations”, initially on a temporary basis and 
now as the result of a statutory amendment which has replaced the previous category 
of religious celebrant with a new category of “religious or belief”.52  
 
There is undoubtedly demand for humanist and other belief weddings in Scotland
53
 
and the statutory amendment was not a matter of any controversy, but simply a small 
step in the progress of religious and belief equality. In England, by contrast, the 
government refused to legalise humanist marriage ceremonies and instead referred the 
matter to the Law Commission for detailed consideration. While there is much to be 
said for the ease of change which resulted from the flexible, responsive and pragmatic 
Scottish system, the deliberations of the English Law Commission make explicit 
some of the uncertainties which remain unconsidered in Scotland.
54
  Permitting 
couples to design their own ceremony and to construct their individual vows enables 
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them “to make their commitment to each other in a way that is meaningful for them”55 
but, as the Law Commission indicated, this must be subject to some limit. It “does not 
and should not mean that the law should regard any expression of commitment as a 
marriage”.56   Without clearer definition of what legal marriage is, however, it is 
difficult to see where to draw this line.  
 
Wedding ceremonies tell us more about fashion than about marriage but the wealth of 
current rituals and symbolism stand in stark contrast to the rather empty concept of 
contemporary legal marriage.
57
 “Belief” weddings are well known for promoting the 
celebration of the individuals
58
 but in Scotland civil weddings, once thought of as 
simple, business like affairs, are also changing. With minimal legal prescription, local 
registrars are encouraging couples to write their own promises and vows and to 
incorporate rituals such as the intermixing of sand, the lighting of “Unity” candles and 
the ancient Celtic ceremony of “handfasting”. Weddings offer couples the opportunity 
to make their own meaning, in the presence of their own communities, but the extent 
to which that meaning is constrained by any underlying legal model has barely been 
considered in Scots family law. It is only in the context of immigration law and 
policy, dominated by the spectre of the “sham marriage”,  that the link between a 
wedding and a “genuine relationship”59 is made explicit. More broadly the question 
remains unresolved as to whether “marriage has become a matter of form, effected 
where prescribed procedures are followed … or involves matters of substance that go 
to the root of the marriage relationship”.60 While couples who marry in Scotland are 
free to create the wedding of their choice, in the absence of explicit legal spousal 
obligations, there is little clarity about to the extent to which, by creating their own 
vows, they are also defining their own version of matrimony: a marriage “created by 
the couple, for the couple”.61 
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Or is it the way of life? 
While weddings have moved to the fore in Scotland, the legal parameters of the 
relationship of husband and wife have all but disappeared. Scots family law operates a 
system of strict separation of property during marriage,
62
 parentage and parenting are 
almost, although not quite, divorced from marriage,
63
 divorce is available on no-fault 
grounds
64
 and, although there are principles for property sharing on divorce,
65
 there is 
also extensive autonomy allowing couples to contract out of their application. While 
the obligation of financial maintenance during marriage remains,
66
 there is little other 
explicit prescription as to what it means to live together as husband and wife. Scots 
law, however, continues to use the phrase “living together as husband and wife” as if 
it were a term of art, “a familiar concept,”67 and it is left to the courts to try to discern 
within it some objective meaning. 
 
Living together as husband and wife, or rather its absence, goes towards the 
establishment of irretrievable breakdown as grounds for divorce.   A couple are held 
“to cohabit with one another only when they are in fact living together as man and 
wife”68 and while the courts, on occasion, have had to determine this issue, the vast 
majority of divorce actions are undefended and thus the decision is commonly left to 
the couple. The date at which a couple cease to cohabit is also relevant, and 
potentially more contentious, in the context of financial provision on divorce.
69
 The 
starting point for financial provision is fair sharing of the fund of matrimonial 
property:
70
 that is property acquired during the marriage and before the “relevant 
date”.71 The relevant date is the date at which the couple ceased to cohabit.72 While 
fixing the relevant date can have a significant impact on the value of matrimonial 
property, it is often a matter of negotiated agreement between the parties, thus 
avoiding the need for the court to scrutinise their relationship. Some insight into how 
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63
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the courts will determine non-cohabitation is offered by the decisions of Banks v 
Banks
73
 and Bain v Bain.
74
 It is a matter of fact in each individual case and 
determination of when a couple cease to live together as husband and wife will 
depend to some extent on what might be described as their normal relationship. In 
some cases that “normal” is “depressing, if not distressing”,75 with a couple being 
judged still to be cohabiting as husband and wife even where there had been no sexual 
relations for many years and despite “the absence of any affection”.76  
 
It is somewhat ironic that the richest source of contemporary commentary in Scots 
law on the relationship of husband and wife is to be found in the developing law of 
unmarried cohabitation.
77
 Eligibility to claim as a cohabitant, for discretionary 
financial provision when cohabitation comes to an end by reason of separation or 
death, depends on meeting the test of “living together as husband and wife”.78 With a 
lack of clarity as to what this means within the context of marriage and in light of 
evidence that “[b]ehavioural expectations in informal unions vary”,79 the challenge 
for the courts is clear. While in the earliest cases under the new legislation, 
cohabitation was admitted, perhaps as the possibility of financial awards becomes 
more established, parties are more frequently challenging the assertion that they have 
lived as husband and wife.
80
 Although cohabitation is widely regarded as a “modern” 
lifestyle, there is a notable reliance on a very old-fashioned model. One sheriff cited a 
judicial description from 1948 of living together as husband and wife as: “the wife 
rendering housewifely duties to the husband and the husband cherishing and 
supporting [her] as a husband should do”.81 While he commented disparagingly that 
this was “scarcely an accurate description of a modern marriage”,82 it is notable that 
the withdrawal of cooking and laundry services, much more than the absence of 
sexual relations, are determinative of the end of cohabitation as husband and wife.  
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While for many years Scots law, and the Scottish courts, have tended to avoid 
detailed engagement with what it means to live together as husband and wife, within 
marriage, they are now being forced to discover its meaning within the context of 
informal cohabitation. The difficulties are increasingly evident and as one sheriff 
commented, cohabitation is “not the relationship of husband and wife albeit the 
definition … uses the analogy of living together as husband and wife”.83  
 
Still meaningful? 
Much “current legal discourse [about marriage] is polarized”84 and in that atmosphere 
there is a danger of arguments becoming associated with one extreme or the other. 
There is a strong narrative which presents marriage as “an institution in crisis”85 and 
against that it can be difficult to raise questions of meaning. Much contemporary 
family law struggles with the place of principles and values. It wants to be modern 
(postmodern) and responsive but in places it clings to the remnants of an older, more 
prescriptive ideology. It wants to be simple and clear but, in the drive to be flexible 
and pragmatic, it can lose coherence and become chaotic. There is “suspicion” of 
“legal enforcement of spousal commitment” 86  but in the absence of clear 
commitment, meaning becomes difficult to discern. These tensions are not new but in 
the context of a revived interest in marriage they are increasingly troubling. Many 
jurisdictions are engaged in the process of reforming the rules in an area, which in 
apparently simpler times, we called the Law of Husband and Wife. In so doing, they 
are all faced with broadly similar evidence of demographic change and social 
behaviour, and although the individual reforms of different jurisdictions may differ in 
degree, there is a common theme around the extent to which marriage remains in 
some way legally “special”. 
 
Scotland is one of many jurisdictions struggling with the remnants of the privileged 
status of marriage while trying to respond to demographic change and social demand 
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for other legally recognised formats. The mixed messages that Scots law sends are 
summed up in two separate statements from a recent government publication designed 
to give guidance on marriage and family law: 
Marriage is special, it is the pillar around which so much of the strength of 
family life is built, and it deserves to be cherished.
87
 
 
Families now come in all shapes and sizes and every family is important no 
matter how it is formed.
88
 
 
The problem is often identified as a problem of social and demographic change but 
family law itself “is a critical but often unappreciated part of the problem”.89 To some 
extent Scots law holds onto the notion that marriage is still special and yet it has 
failed or omitted to identify what it is that makes it special. While reformers try to 
respond to changing family life and to the needs of contemporary society, their failure 
to deal with these underlying tensions has an impact. The absence of clear legal 
meaning in marriage is not simply an interesting oddity, in stark contrast to the deeply 
held and strongly expressed philosophical and moral meanings in current discourse, 
but increasingly the cause of artificial distinctions in practice.
90
 Resolving the 
tensions is by no means an easy task but we should begin to try.
91
 During the quiet 
years when marriage received little scrutiny, we could get by with only vague 
references to its “well established meaning” or to its “universal understanding”. Now 
that it is once more the centre of attention, the lack of meaning and the absence of 
contemporary definition is increasingly troubling. If marriage is to be retained as a 
special institution in law then it needs more careful scrutiny to clarify what it is that 
makes it special and what family law expects from it. It is of course possible that, in 
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the process of searching for meaning, we will decide that family law has moved 
“beyond marriage”.92  
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